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Abstract
Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means
of screening and sanctioning shirking public ocials. This paper proposes a novel ratio-
nale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological
costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These non-pecuniary costs
imply that campaigns inuence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational
or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk.
They inuence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the
electorate is better o when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being ap-
pointed exogenously - but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we nd
that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates
are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important
benets beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.
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\We have won with an ample margin. But, far from putting us in a position of privilege,
this puts us instead in a position of greater responsibility and obligation."
Argentina's rst lady, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, after winning the general election
with 45% of all votes - almost twice the number of the runner-up (2007/10/29)
Expenditures for political campaigns are skyrocketing (e.g. see, Benoit and Marsh 2008;
Stratmann 2005) and often described as an inecient \arms-race" (e.g. see, Abrams and Settle
2004). Although electoral campaigns are anything but cheap, rational choice scholars generally
consider their content as cheap talk (e.g. see, Austen-Smith and Banks 1989; Barro 1973;
Ferejohn 1986). Candidates can promise almost anything in pre-election campaigns, but voters
do not have any direct means to enforce promises (see Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999).1
We outline a psychological rationale why voters might nevertheless benet from elections
and electoral campaigns. Our idea is based on the observation that human behavior is not
characterized by pure self-interest, but is also driven by other-regarding preferences and intrinsic
norm compliance (e.g. Cooper and Kagel 2009; Fehr and Schmidt 2002; Fowler and Kam
2007). Extensive experimental evidence suggests that people tend to tell the truth in strategic
situations, even if reputation is not at stake (e.g., Lundquist et al. 2009). Scholars usually
explain this phenomenon by arguing that people incur psychological costs if they do not live up
to their promises (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Hao and Houser 2010; Shalvi et al. 2011). Several reasons
for such non-pecuniary costs of lying have been suggested, as for example the desire to maintain
a positive self-image (see Fischbacher and Heusi 2008; Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008). Others
have argued that individuals feel guilty if they do not meet others' expectations (see Baumeister,
Stillwell and Heatherton 1994; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). Whatever the exact roots of
the costs of lying are, their existence implies that electoral campaigns might not just be cheap
talk. They potentially guide future oce behavior. To the extent to which promises inuence
the winner's subsequent behavior, the constituency might benet from electoral competition,
where candidates outrun each other with campaign promises.2
We test our conjecture with incentivized lab experiments studying both the behavior of
1Elections serve as an indirect instrument for promoting representation. In repeated elections with non-
binding or a complete lack of term limits, voters can threaten to vote dishonest politicians out of oce (e.g. see,
Ferejohn 1986; Key 1966).
2More intensive campaigns are not always more benecial for voters. For example in an environment with
informational asymmetries and pandering candidates, campaigns might include socially inecient promises.
Keeping such exaggerated promises could thus imply a waste of public money.
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representative and voters in a stylized delegated democracy. In our benchmark \Election"
treatment two candidates competed for oce in an election with ve voters. Both candidates
simultaneously promised how much money they would distribute to the electorate if they won.
Promises were not enforceable and thus non-binding for the candidates. The electorate was
therefore uncertain about how their representatives would behave once elected. The winner
was determined by majority rule and was entrusted with a budget that she could share with
the electorate or keep for herself. This game captures the elementary tradeo representatives
face in situations where their personal interests do not coincide with those of the public.
We compare treatment Election with two additional treatments. In treatment \Random",
we eliminated electoral competition by replacing the election with a random selection mech-
anism. The approval rate was randomly determined by the experimenter using a large die
in front of all participants. By contrasting treatment Election with Random, we are able to
analyze the causal eects of electoral competition on promises and oce behavior. In the
second additional treatment \NoCampaign", voters could choose their preferred candidate as
in treatment Election, but the candidates were not allowed to run electoral campaigns. This
treatment sheds light on the impact of campaign promises on the candidates' benevolence.
Our experiment provides the following insights. First, electoral competition intensied
campaign promises. Candidates promised signicantly more benets in democratic elections
than if they were randomly appointed. Second, promises aected subsequent oce behavior.
We nd an average degree of promise fulllment of roughly 60 percent, despite conicting
self-interest and the absence of reputational concerns. This suggests that lying creates non-
pecuniary or psychological costs. Third, eliminating electoral competition led to a substantial
drop in the candidates' benevolence. Furthermore, we observe that when candidates were not
allowed to make any promises (in treatment NoCampaign), voters were just as badly o as in
the absence of elections. Together, these results suggest that not only electoral competition
matters, but also the ability to make pre-election promises. Finally, we found that candidates'
benevolence increased with their approval rate. This indicates that costs of lying increase with
the share of supporters a candidate would let down. This relationship was much weaker in
the two control treatments NoCampaign and Random, where the approval rate was less or not
informative about voters' expectations.
We opted for an experimental approach because it allows us to identify the impact of lying
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aversion under tightly controlled conditions. A separation of intrinsically motivated honesty
from reputational motives is inherently dicult with observational eld data, as politicians
often face looming re-elections, future career plans, or other image concerns. Moreover, voters
can weed out dishonest candidates in repeated elections, creating additional potential for se-
lection bias. It is important to disentangle the psychological costs of lying from reputational
motives and adverse selection because it improves our knowledge about how elections inuence
leadership behavior and it provides valuable input for the design of political institutions. We
designed our experiment in such a way that we can sidestep reputational concerns and selection
eects. Because our election was only for one term, voters could not punish or weed out less
benevolent leaders. Moreover, all participants interacted anonymously with each other using
a computer interface and their true identities were never revealed to the other participants at
any point in time. Another advantage of our experimental approach is that we can exogenously
assign constituencies to dierent democratic institutions. We thus avoid the methodological
problems implied by the potential endogeneity of political institutions (e.g. see Besley and Case
2003).3
Related Literature
The theoretical literature has predominantly focused on two key mechanisms through which
elections inuence policy making. According to the accountability or moral hazard view (see
Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Key 1966), the threat of looming re-elections disciplines incum-
bents. Other theories have emphasized the role of elections as a selection device, giving voters
the opportunity to weed out incompetent or dishonest politicians (see Ashworth 2005; Ash-
worth and de Mesquita 2008; Besley 2005; Fearon 1999; Gordon, Huber and Landa 2007).4
Disentangling selection from accountability eects is challenging, because both mechanisms
often have observationally equivalent implications. A common empirical approach is to take
advantage of binding term limits and to analyze how the lack of electoral incentives aects pol-
icy making in the last term. The evidence is consistent with both accountability and selection
eects (see Besley and Case 2003). Alt, de Mesquita and Rose (2011) for example use variation
3We discuss potential limitations of our lab experimental approach in the conclusion.
4In the presence of informational asymmetries repeated elections can also create counterproductive incentives
for politicians to pander to public opinion (see Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts 2001; Maskin and Tirole 2004).
Woon (2012) however nds no evidence for pandering in his experimental study.
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in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time and nd that the impact of re-election
incentives and selection on government performance are of similar magnitude (see also Ferraz
and Finan 2011; Gagliarducci and Nannicini N.d.; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000 for further
recent evidence on selection and accountability eects). We rule out reputational concerns in
our study by design, and are able to control for selection eects. We therefore contribute to
this extensive literature by providing novel evidence that elections convey motivational benets
beyond their mere role as selection and sanctioning devices.5
Our paper further adds to the literature in the following ways. First, scholars of pledge
fulllment analyzed the extent to which elected representatives and political parties live up to
their campaign promises. Petry (2009) surveyed 18 studies from various countries and found
that 67 percent of promises are kept on average. The degree of pledge fulllment is often
noted as surprisingly high, because the general population tends to believe that politicians are
untrustworthy (see Thomson 2011). While most of the literature has focused on party promises,
fewer papers studied promise keeping (or congruence with pre-election issue positions) on the
level of a single representative. Individual level studies have drawn similar conclusions (e.g. see
Fishel 1985; Ringquist and Dasse 2004; Schwarz, Schadel and Ladner 2010; Sulkin and Swigger
2008; Sulkin 2009). Both reputational concerns and the psychological costs of lying can explain
promise keeping in all existing studies. Our controlled lab experiment allows us to disentangle
the psychological cost of lying from other pecuniary costs implied by a loss of reputation.
Moreover, we exogenously manipulate key features of democratic institutions. We are thus able
to study the causal eects of democratic institutions on candidates' behavior, complementing
the existing eld studies.
Second, random appointment of public ocials by lot (also known as \sortition") was a
core feature in the ancient Athenian democracy (see Headlam 1933; Manin, Przeworski and
Stokes 1999). Various forms of sortition were also practiced in medieval and renaissance Italian
city-states (mostly Florence and Venice), 16th century England, as well as in some of the Lands-
gemeinden in Switzerland until 1837 (see Carson and Martin 1999; Engelstad 1989; Tridimas
2011).6 A well known modern form of random selection of social decision makers are juries in
court cases. Rotation schemes, as they are used for example for selecting the Presidency of the
5While our results are not confounded by selection eects, the presence of lying aversion enables elections to
be used as selection devices even when campaigns would otherwise be meaningless.
6See also Elster (1989) for a more general discussion of randomization in social decision-making.
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Council of the European Union, also share basic features of sortition. Advocates of sortition
have argued that random appointment of public ocials achieves a more accurate descriptive
representation (e.g. Burnheim 1985; Mueller, Tollison and Thomas 1972). Moreover, random
appointment is thought to attenuate the incentives for self-interested rent-seeking activities and
promotes political equality (see Lockard 2003; Mulgan 1984). Our results suggest that these
potential benets should be carefully weighed against the potential costs of less motivated
representatives.
Third, several models in political economy assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that politi-
cians' promises are credible and binding. For example, in Groseclose and Snyder (1996) can-
didates make binding promises that advantage specic sub-groups of voters.7 Other models
show that the credibility of political campaigns depends on the repeated nature of electoral
competitions (e.g., Alesina 1988, Alesina and Spear 1988). Our ndings provide a behavioral
rationale why winning candidates might stick to their promise even in the absence of repetitions
and reputation. While we believe that reputational concerns can inuence the credibility of
campaigns too, our results show that reputational concerns are no necessary prerequisite.
Fourth, we add to the growing eld of experimental political economy (e.g. see Grosser and
Schram 2006, 2010; Kube and Puppe 2009; Morton and Williams 2010; Woon 2012). Three
related studies analyzed the eects of democratic choice on cooperation and public goods provi-
sion. Hamman, Weber and Woon (2011) nd higher public goods provision when contribution
decisions are democratically delegated rather than decentralized. Hamman et al. complement
our results by focusing on the role of elections in selecting pro-social representatives. The exper-
iments by Dal Bo, Foster and Putterman (2010) suggest that the impact of a given rule depends
on whether it was democratically chosen or exogenously imposed on the subjects through an-
other mechanism. Olken (2010) conducted a eld experiment in Indonesia to study the causal
eects of direct democratic participation in local development programs. He found that direct
participation in the political decision making process increased satisfaction and the perceived
legitimacy of the program. We complement these studies by showing that democratic elections
and higher electoral support can increase the leaders' benevolence.
Finally, a recent strand of experiments analyzed the behavioral implications of leadership
7Under this assumption, Groseclose and Snyder (1996) show that politicians do not need to target all voters
with their promises, but instead target only a minimum winning coalition of voters in order to succeed in the
electoral competition.
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(e.g. De Cremer and van Knippenberg 2005; Gachter et al. N.d.; Glockner et al. 2011; Guth et al.
2007; Hermalin 1998). Leadership in existing experiments is typically assigned exogenously (i.e.
randomly). Our results suggest that leaders may behave dierently if they have to compete for
leadership rather than if their role is exogenously assigned (see also Brandts, Guth and Stiehler
2006; Brandts, Cooper and Weber 2011), particularly when competition promotes promise
making.
Experimental Design
We conducted laboratory experiments to study democratic elections under controlled condi-
tions. The experiments were conducted at the University of Bonn (BonnEconLab). Subjects
were randomly recruited from the BonnEconLab general subject pool, which consisted of ap-
proximately 3000 students from all disciplines (excluding psychology) and from various stages
in their studies (background statistics are reported in the supporting information). We ran ve
sessions with a total of 210 subjects. This resulted in 10 independent constituencies for each
of the three treatments. Each constituency consisted of seven participants who were randomly
assigned to one of two roles: candidate (two subjects) or voter (ve subjects).
Subjects made their decisions on the computer screen using the z-tree interface (Fischbacher
2007). Every computer was located in a private booth ensuring that the participants interacted
anonymously with each other. This high degree of anonymity was required in order to rule
out any reputational concerns among the participants. At the beginning of the experiment, all
subjects received written and verbal instructions explaining the dierent stages of the game and
the payos (see the Supporting Information for sample instructions). After participants had
read the instructions, they answered control questions, ensuring that everyone understood the
game. All earnings were computed in tokens and converted into cash using an exchange rate of
e4 per 100 tokens at the end of the experiment. Subjects received an additional show-up-fee
of e4 for their participation. The entire experiment lasted approximately 40 minutes.
The benchmark treatment \Election" consisted of the following ve stages:
Stage 1 Campaigns: In the rst stage, candidates pursued their electoral campaigns.
Campaigns were non-binding and consisted of two parts. In the compulsory part, candidates
promised citizens how many tokens (between 0 and the maximum budget of 450 tokens) they
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would distribute equally among the citizens. In addition, candidates had the option of sending a
text message (up to 300 characters) to the electorate. Both candidates pursued their campaigns
simultaneously and their campaigns were not revealed to the opponent.
Stage 2 Voting: Each citizen voted for one of the two candidates in the second stage.
The winner was determined by majority rule, received a xed payment of 30 tokens, and was
entrusted with a discretionary budget of 450 tokens. The outcome of the election was only
announced later on, in Stage 5 of the game.
Stage 3 Distribution: Before the candidates knew the outcome of the election, each
candidate decided how many tokens she would actually distribute, conditional on winning the
election with 60, 80, and 100 percent of votes.8 This design feature made it possible to analyze
the behavior of both winners and losers, therefore circumventing a potential selection bias from
citizens electing the more benevolent candidates.
Stage 4 Belief elicitation: In stage four, citizens had to guess how many tokens each
candidate would distribute, and each candidate guessed (conditional on the outcome of the
election) the average amount citizens expect her to distribute. In order to elicit beliefs in an
incentive-compatible way, we rewarded correct beliefs with 10 tokens. The reward was reduced
by one token for each unit that the stated belief diered from the actual value, down to a
minimum of zero tokens.9
Stage 5 Payo realization: The winner of the election was announced in the nal stage
and, depending on the actual approval rate and the choices made in stage 3, the payos were
realized.
All participants were informed that this election game was played for one round only, and
that their identities were not revealed at any point in time. This allowed us to rule out
reputational concerns and to test whether elections confer benets beyond their functions as
sanctioning and selection devices in repeated settings.
We conducted two additional treatments (Table 1 summarizes the tasks involved in our
treatments). Treatment \Random" was identical to treatment Election, except that the elec-
toral outcome was randomly determined by the experimenter using a large die visible for
8This approach of eliciting conditional responses is frequently used in the experimental literature and is called
the \strategy method" (see Selten 1967 and Brandts and Charness 2011). At the end of the results section we
show that our main results are robust if we elicit direct (i.e. unconditional) responses.
9We report our analysis of second-order beliefs in the Supporting Information.
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Table 1: Treatment Summary
Election Random NoCampaign
Campaign stage Yes Yes No
Voting stage Voters Random device Voters
Distribution stage Yes Yes Yes
everyone. This was common knowledge among all participants.10 The campaign stage re-
mained. This procedure eliminated electoral competition and the rationale for making gen-
erous promises. Moreover, it provides a baseline measure of candidates' benevolence in the
absence of competitive pressure. In the second treatment, \NoCampaign", citizens voted for
their candidates as in treatment Election, but candidates were not allowed to run electoral
campaigns. By comparing NoCampaign with Election, we are able to identify the causal role
of campaign promises, holding electoral competition constant. Together, our three treatments
allow us to identify the causal eect of candidates' promises and electoral competition on the
representatives' behavior.11
Framework and Hypotheses
In this section, we provide a simple formal framework of electoral competition and campaign
promises, where voters are uninformed about the candidates' honesty. Recent theoretical ap-
proaches, analyzing the inuence of costs of lying in models of spatial electoral competition,
inspired our analysis (Banks 1990; Callander and Wilkie 2007; Callander 2008; Kartik and
McAfee 2007). Our framework departs from these models in two dimensions. First, we assume
that costs of lying increase with the rate of approval. The rationale behind this assumption
is that approval rates reect voters' expectations. As highlighted in our opening quote by
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, voters' expectations can increase feelings of obligation and
guilt in elected representatives (see also Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton 1994; Charness
and Dufwenberg 2006 for a discussion about the relationship between feelings of guilt and ex-
10The rules of the game were transparent to all participants, and the experiment did not involve any form of
deception.
11We ran an additional classroom experiment to classify the text messages candidates sent in treatments
Election and Random, following Houser and Xiao (2011). Our results remain unchanged if we control for the
type of text messages candidates sent. Text messages are unrelated to candidates' benevolence. However,
messages that include a statement of intent or promise increase voters' expectations about what a candidate
is going to distribute (and consequently increase electoral success). See the Supporting Information for more
details.
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pectation). Second, rather than assuming that the preferences of candidates and voters are
distributed over a policy space, we model a situation in which the interests of politicians and
voters are unambiguously in conict.
Following our experimental design, we assume that two candidates i (where i = A;B),
compete for oce in a one-shot election with an odd, nite number of voters, n  3.12 Both
candidates simultaneously make their promises, Pi, in the rst stage of the game. Voters then
cast their vote for their preferred candidate. Let us indicate the number of votes for the winner
with k and the simple majority with m = n+12 . Conditional on the realized approval rate,
k
n  mn = n+12n , the elected candidate chooses how much money Si she actually distributes in
total to the voters. We restrict Pi and Si such that they can take on any value between 0 and
a discretionary budget, I 2 R+, assigned to the elected candidate. We normalize the utility
of the losing candidate to zero in order to simplify the analysis. The utility of the winning
candidate i is given by
Ui

Pi; Si;
k
n
; i

= E + I   Si   iCi

Pi; Si;
k
n

; (1)
where E  0 is a xed payment or wage that cannot be distributed to the voters and
Ci
 
Pi; Si;
k
n

are the psychological costs of lying. In particular, we assume that
Ci

Pi; Si;
k
n

=
8><>:
k
n
1
2
(Pi Si)
Pi
2
; if Pi > 0 and Si < Pi;
0; otherwise.
(2)
i  0 is a parameter that captures how sensitive candidate i is to the psychological costs
of lying. If i = 0; then lying is costless for candidate i. On the other hand, if i > 0;
then candidate i is lying averse. Her utility decreases with the squared dierence between her
promise and the distributed amount.13 Moreover, costs of lying increase with the candidate's
approval rate; kn ; and promise, Pi.
Candidates may be of two types, H and L, diering with respect to i. In particular, let
H > L > 1 be the degree of lying-aversion for typeH and L, respectively. L > 1 implies that
both types of candidates distribute a positive amount when (i) they promise a strictly positive
12We refer to male voters and female candidates.
13Consonant empirical evidence for this assumption can be found in Lundquist et al. (2009). In their experi-
ment subjects were less likely to send insincere messages in strategic situations the further their lie would deviate
from the truth, in particular when the message is explicitly framed as a promise.
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amount and (ii) they are elected unanimously. The candidates' types are randomly drawn by
nature from the same ex-ante probability distribution. In particular, let  and (1  ) be the
probabilities that i is of type L, respectively of type H. We assume that voters are uninformed
about the candidates' type.
Voting is costless and compulsory. Each voter casts his vote for the candidate he expects
to be the most benevolent. The ex-post utility of each voter therefore consists of any ane
transformation of the amount of money the electorate receives from the elected representative.
Focusing on Perfect Bayesian equilibria where voters do not play weakly dominated strate-
gies14, the model yields the following testable predictions:
H1. Candidates promise to be more benevolent when they face electoral competition than
when they are randomly appointed.
H2. The candidates' promises inuence voting behavior.
H3. Voters are better o when candidates are democratically elected and run campaigns,
rather than when leaders are randomly selected or when they are not allowed to run electoral
campaigns.
H4. The larger candidates' promises and the higher their approval rates, the more benev-
olent are the elected candidates.
The intuition behind these theoretical predictions is as follows (formal proofs and additional
results are in the Supporting Information). From equation (2) we can infer that every candidate
who promises zero, will distribute nothing, and every candidate who makes a positive promise,
since L > 1, will distribute a fraction of her promise (that is increasing with the approval
rate).15 In treatment Election voters anticipate that promises are partially fullled and cast
their vote for the candidate who promises to distribute the larger amount. Because promises
are not considered as cheap talk candidates use them strategically to win the election. The
electoral competition thus induces candidates to outbid each others' promises.
In treatment NoCampaign candidates cannot make any campaign promises. Similarly, the
absence of electoral competition in treatment Random implies that candidates have no incentive
to promise positive amounts. In both cases, winning candidates distribute nothing and suer
14As shown in the Supporting Information, this assumption rules out unintuitive equilibria where voters prefer
candidates who promise and distribute zero rather than candidates who promise and distribute strictly positive
amounts.
15The model admits multiple equilibria in which the promises made by candidates are strictly lower than the
budget I.
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no psychological cost because they did not promise anything in the rst place. Consequently,
voters receive higher payos when candidates compete for appointment with campaign promises
rather than when they are randomly selected or in the absence of electoral campaigns.
These theoretical predictions would change if candidates did not incur psychological costs of
lying. For example, when candidates are purely self-interested, the winning candidates do not
distribute anything in either treatment, irrespective of their promises. Promises are therefore
cheap talk and voters do not take them into account when they cast their vote. Similarly,
in a model where candidates are motivated by other-regarding preferences (e.g., altruism or
inequality aversion) instead of lying aversion, their benevolence would not dier across treat-
ments.16 Pro-social candidates would, irrespective of their promises, always distribute whatever
is optimal for them, given their degree of pro-sociality.17
Experimental Results
Our results are presented in three steps. First, we analyze the impact of electoral competition
on campaign promises. We then test whether voters consider promises to be cheap talk, and
whether electoral outcomes reect voters' expectations. Finally, we investigate the extent to
which electoral competition and campaigns aect the behavior of oce holders.
Campaigns
Figure 1 shows kernel density estimates for the amount of money the candidates promised, de-
pending on whether they were democratically elected (Election) or appointed by lot (Random).
While candidates frequently promised low amounts of money in treatment Random, most
promises in treatment Election were in the top range of the available budget. In comparison
with treatment Random, promises in Election were on average twice as high (165 versus 325
tokens). This dierence is statistically signicant according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p =
0:001).18 Many candidates in treatment Election do not promise the maximum amount of
distributable tokens, but their promises seem to be driven by concerns for equality. The
16Although selsh candidates would mimic pro-social competitors by making the same equilibrium promises
in treatment Election.
17In the presence of other-regarding preferences, candidates' benevolence only diers between treatments when
we add psychological costs of lying. In the Supporting Information we discuss how to extend our model with
such a combination of other-regarding preferences and psychological costs of lying.
18All reported p-values are based on two-sided tests.
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Figure 1: Electoral competition and Promises
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density in Figure 1 peaks at 375 and 400 tokens, which (depending on whether the winner's
xed payment of 30 is considered in the calculations) imply equal payos for the winner and
voters. The following result summarizes our ndings:
Result 1. Electoral competition triggers more generous campaign promises.
Voting
Do voters take campaign promises into account? We analyze how promises inuence voters'
expectations using the following regression model:
Enc[Si] = + 1Pic + nic; (3)
Where Enc[Si] is the average number of tokens that voter n in constituency c believes
candidate i will distribute. Pic is the promise candidate i in constituency c makes. The model
is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Standard errors are corrected for clustering,
accounting for dependency of the error term nic within each constituency.
19 We extend our
empirical model and include 2P
2
ic in order to test whether excessively high promises are less
credible.
19The results remain qualitatively the same if we use a Tobit model instead.
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Table 2: Promises and Expectations
(1) (2)
Promise 0.426*** 1.174***
(0.101) (0.127)
(Promise)2 -0.002***
(0.000)
Constant 89.125** 30.004***
(31.477) (6.258)
R2 0.112 0.138
Obs. 100 100
Sample Election Election
Notes: This table shows OLS coecient estimates (standard errors in parentheses are corrected for
clustering on the level of each electorate). The dependent variable is the number of tokens voter n
believed that candidate i would distribute. \Promise", resp. \(Promise)2" is the (squared) number
of tokens the candidate promised. The results remain qualitatively the same if we use a Tobit model
as an alternative. Signicance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The results from column (1) of Table 2 show that promises have a signicant inuence on
expectations, suggesting that voters do not consider promises to be merely cheap talk. However,
the signicant coecient for squared promises in column (2) suggests that the relationship
between promises and beliefs is hump-shaped.20 The decrease in credibility is reasonable,
given that fullling very generous promises is more costly for candidates. According to the
regression results, promises which exceed 375.5 tokens become less credible. Strikingly, the peak
mentioned above at 375 in the distribution of promises in Figure 1 suggests that candidates
correctly anticipated this nonlinear relationship.
We complement these results and estimate the eect of promises on voting behavior using
the following linear empirical model:
vnAc = + 1(PAc   PBc) + nAc; (4)
where vnAc is a dummy variable indicating whether voter n in constituency c supported
candidate A. PAc PBc is the absolute dierence between promises (in hundreds of tokens) be-
tween candidate A and B. We used OLS21 to estimate the linear probability model in equation 4
and corrected the standard errors for clustering of voting decisions within each constituency.
We separately included the squared dierence in promises (2(PAc   PBc)2) to capture poten-
20See the Supporting Information for a visualization of the relationship.
21The results are robust if we use a Probit model.
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Table 3: Promises and Voting
(1) (2)
A;BPromise 0.146 0.321***
(0.116) (0.088)
(A;BPromise)
2 -0.194***
(0.057)
Constant 0.579*** 0.684***
(0.096) (0.082)
R2 0.065 0.180
Obs. 50 50
Sample Election Election
Notes: This table shows OLS coecient estimates (standard errors in parentheses are corrected for
clustering on the level of each electorate). The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether a voter casted his vote for candidate A. \A;BPromise" respectively \(A;BPromise)
2" is
the (squared) dierence between the number of tokens candidates A and B promise (in hundreds
of tokens).The results remain qualitatively the same if we use a Probit model as an alternative.
Signicance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
tial nonlinearities. The results in column (1) of Table 3 suggest that voters tend (although
not statistically signicant) to vote for the candidate who promises more than his opponents.
However, the results in column (2) show that the moderate eect in column (1) is masked
by a statistically signicant nonlinear relationship: more generous promises increase political
support but only up to a certain point. Based on the parameter estimates electoral success is,
ceteris paribus, maximized for promises exceeding the opponents promise by 82.7 tokens (see
also the corresponding gure in the Supporting Information).
Overall, we nd that the electoral outcome reects voters' expectations about the can-
didates' benevolence. In nine out of ten elections, voters elected the candidate whom they
expected to be more benevolent (2-test:p = 0:016). The main ndings are summarized in our
second result:
Result 2. Voters do not treat promises as cheap talk and take them into account when
deciding whom to vote for. Election outcomes reect voters' expectations about the candidates'
benevolence.
Benevolence of Representatives
We have shown that candidates promise more if they face electoral competition rather than
if they are randomly appointed. But do candidates live up to their promises? We answer
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this question by creating a measure of promise fulllment. Our measure consists of the ratio
between the actual number of distributed tokens and the candidate's promise.22 On average,
we nd relatively high levels of pledge fulllment in treatment Election (59.8% with a 95%
condence interval of: 43.8%, 75.7%) as well as in Random (63.4% with a 95% condence
interval of: 42.8%, 84.0%). The similarity in pledge fulllment suggests that elections do not
cause dierences in the degree of lying aversion but operate through candidate competition
(see also the corresponding gure in the Supporting Information which depicts the distribution
of pledge fulllment ratios). Strikingly, these rates of pledge fulllment are comparable with
the degree of pledge fulllment observed in eld studies (see Petry 2009).
Given that promises were partially fullled, the more generous promises in Election trans-
lated into higher monetary benets for the voters. The cumulative distribution functions for
the number of distributed tokens in Figure 2 show that voters were substantially more likely
to be better o in treatment Election than in Random. For example, the probability that a
candidate distributed more than a hundred tokens is 0:75 in the Election treatment, but only
0:2 in Random.
Figure 2: Democratic Institutions and Benevolence
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On average (over all approval rates), candidates distributed 197 tokens in treatment Elec-
22Four candidates distributed a larger amount than what they promised. We set their ratio of pledge fulllment
to 1 in our analysis.
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tion, but only 76 tokens in treatment Random. The dierence is statistically signicant
(p = 0:003) according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.23
Table 4: Democratic Institutions and Benevolence
(1) (2) (3)
Election 121.217*** 57.169 121.217***
(39.392) (49.205) (39.392)
Promise 0.401***
(0.139)
NoCampaign -34.750
(29.696)
Constant 75.500*** 9.448 75.500***
(26.005) (14.178) (26.005)
Wald test:
Election=NoCampaign 0.000
R2 0.199 0.351 0.287
Obs. 40 40 60
Sample Election Election Full
& Random & Random
Notes: This table shows OLS coecient estimates (with robust standard errors in parentheses). The
dependent variable is the number of tokens (averaged over all three approval rates) that candidates
distributed. \Election" and \NoCampaign" are treatment dummy variables. Random is considered as
the reference category. \Promise" is the number of tokens the candidate promised. The results remain
qualitatively the same if we use a Tobit model as an alternative. Signicance levels are denoted as
follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The OLS regression results in column (1) of Table 4 corroborate the nonparametric analysis.
We estimated the following linear regression model:
Si = + 1Ei + i; (5)
where Si is the number of tokens distributed by candidate i (averaged over all three ap-
proval rates) and Ei is a dummy for treatment Election. The results in column (1) show that
candidates distribute 121 tokens more in treatment Election than in Random. In column (2),
we additionally control for promises and nd that they signicantly predict the candidates'
actual oce behavior. Remarkably, the coecient for Ei is much smaller and is no longer
statistically signicant when we control for promises, suggesting that the treatment eect is
mediated through promises.
23We alternatively compared the distributed amount in Election and Random for each approval rate separately
and found that all the dierences are statistically signicant using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (p < 0:05).
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In treatment NoCampaign, candidates could not make any pre-election promises. Com-
paring treatments Election and NoCampaign therefore provides more direct evidence on the
inuence of promises. As shown in Figure 2, candidates are much more likely to distribute
lower numbers of tokens in NoCampaign than in Election. On average, candidates distributed
only 41 tokens in NoCampaign. This is signicantly less than in treatment Election (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: p < 0:001). Although candidates distributed slightly more tokens in Random
than in NoCampaign, the dierence is statistically insignicant (p = :522). The regression es-
timates reported in column (3) of Table 4 conrm these nonparametric results. We summarize
the ndings as follows:
Result 3. Representatives behave more benevolently when they are democratically elected
than when they are randomly appointed by lot. The dierence seems to be driven by the less
generous promises in the absence of electoral competition. Eliminating the possibility of making
campaign promises leads to a corresponding reduction in the monetary payo for the electorate.
We have shown that the approval rate in an election is a signal of how much voters trust
the candidates. The psychological costs of disappointing others should therefore increase with
the approval rate in the Election treatment. In contrast, the randomly generated approval rate
in treatment Random contains no information about voters' expectations. And in the NoCam-
paign treatment, voters have no information about the dierent candidates, i.e. the voters'
choices can be considered unintentional. We should consequently see a positive correlation
between approval rates and the number of tokens distributed in the Election treatment, but
not in treatments Random or NoCampaign. Figure 3 provides supporting evidence.
The number of tokens distributed markedly increased with the approval rate in the Election
treatment, while it remained much atter in the other two treatments, where approval rates
contained less or no information.
In Table 5, we separately regress the number of tokens distributed by candidate i on the ap-
proval rates kn for each treatment. We further included promises Pi as an additional explanatory
variable in our linear regression model for treatment Election and Random (see equation 7).
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering of the error term i on the level of each candidate.
Si(
k
n
) = + 1(
k
n
) + 2Pi + i; (6)
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Figure 3: Political Support and Voter's Material Welfare
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In the Election treatment (column 1), we nd that the coecient for the approval rate is
positive and highly signicant (p < 0:001). In contrast, the approval rate has a much lower
impact on the candidates' behavior in Random (see column (2)). The coecient for the ap-
proval rate is almost four times smaller than in Election and only reaches marginal signicance
(p < 0:1). We nd no signicant relationship between approval rates and benevolence in the
NoCampaign treatment (see column (3) in Table 5). To test whether the relationship between
the approval rate and the voters' payo is signicantly stronger in Election than in NoCam-
paign and Random, we pooled the data from all three treatments and added interaction terms
between the treatment dummies and the approval rate in column (4). The interaction term
for the Election treatment is large and statistically signicant. A Wald tests rejects the null
hypothesis that the coecients for \Approval*Election" and \Approval*Random" are equally
large (p = 0:012). Our last result summarizes these ndings:
Result 4. The higher candidates' approval rates are, the more benevolently do they behave.
This relationship is absent or much less pronounced when approval rates are based on random
or uninformed voting.
By asking for a conditional distribution choice for each approval rate, we might have arti-
cially induced candidates to condition their decisions on the approval rates. In order to rule
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Table 5: Approval Rates and Benevolence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Approval (in %) 2.390*** 0.613* 0.163 0.163**
(0.562) (0.325) (0.197) (0.063)
Promise 0.427*** 0.387*
(0.138) (0.201)
Election -22.233
(52.367)
Random -1.250
(29.146)
Approval*Election 2.227***
(0.602)
Approval*Random 0.450
(0.295)
Constant -133.088** -37.233 27.750 27.750
(60.224) (26.297) (22.631) (16.708)
R2 0.188 0.258 0.002 0.296
Obs. 60 60 60 180
Sample Election Random NoCampaign Full
Notes: This table shows OLS coecient estimates (standard errors are given in parentheses and
corrected for clustering on the level of each candidate). The dependent variable is the number of
tokens candidates distributed to the electorate for each approval rate. The variable \Approval (in %)"
indicates the approval rate. \Election" and \Random" are dummy variables indicating the Election
and the Random treatments, respectively. \NoCampaign" is considered the reference category in
column (4). The results remain qualitatively the same if we use a Tobit model as an alternative.
Signicance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
out the possibility that our results are an artifact of the strategy method, we used the direct
response method in the additional control treatment \Election (direct)". The winning candi-
date made a single distribution decision only after having learned the electoral outcome. In
order to increase the number of observations we reduced the number of voters per constituency
to three, and repeated the game for three periods. We excluded reputational concerns by re-
matching the candidates with a new set of voters and a new contestant in every period. Based
on 220 recruited subjects we collected 132 distribution decisions from elected representatives
(see Supporting Information for more details on the experimental design).
Figure 4 shows that we replicated our main result with the direct response method, sug-
gesting that the relationship between approval rate and benevolence is not an artifact of the
strategy method. Candidates elected with unanimity distributed 38% more money than those
elected with two third's majority.
In Table 6 we used OLS to regress the number of tokens distributed by candidate i in period
19
Figure 4: Approval and Benevolence (Direct Response Method)
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t on the approval rates kn . We control for promises Pit because they might have inuenced the
approval rates (see equation 7). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering of the error term
ict on the level of each constituency.
Sict = + 1(
k
n
) + 2Pit + ict; (7)
The results in column (1) show that the relationship between approval rates and benevolence
is statistically signicant. Moreover, we cannot reject that the coecient is equally large as
the one found using the strategy method in column (2) of Table 5 (p = 0:585). In column
(2) we additionally included the control variable Experience, which indicates the number of
times candidate i has been elected in a specic period t. The coecient estimate suggests that
experience has no signicant inuence on representatives' benevolence.
Conclusion
This paper sheds novel light on the role of campaign promises in democratic elections using
an experiment where the behavior of both representatives and voters can be studied under
controlled conditions. Our ndings show that electoral competition promoted candidates to
make more generous campaign promises, and that promises are partially fullled. Voters were
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Table 6: Regression Results (Direct Response Method)
(1) (2)
Approval (in %) 1.983*** 1.993***
(0.490) (0.489)
Promise 0.442** 0.464**
(0.192) (0.202)
Experience -11.617
(12.550)
Constant -119.662 -121.935
(83.814) (83.455)
R2 0.063 0.066
Obs. 132 132
Sample Election (direct) Election (direct)
Notes: This table shows OLS coecient estimates (standard errors in parentheses are corrected for
clustering on the level of each session). The dependent variable is the number of tokens candidates
distributed to the electorate in period t. The variable \Approval (in %)" indicates the approval
rate. \Experience" captures the number of times a candidate was elected and \Promise" is the
number of tokens the candidate promised. Signicance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
therefore better o in elections rather than if their leaders were randomly appointed { but only
if candidates were given the opportunity to make campaign promises. Our analysis of voting
behavior showed that voters did not consider promises as cheap talk and that they cast their
votes for candidates who promised more. However, this relationship was nonlinear, as voters
considered extremely generous campaign promises to be implausible.
These ndings have important implications for the advancement of both theoretical work
on and the design of democratic institutions. Our empirical evidence is supportive for nascent
theoretical approaches considering lying aversion and character in formal models of campaign
promises and policy making (see Banks 1990; Callander andWilkie 2007; Callander 2008; Kartik
and McAfee 2007). More generally, our results are informative for the design of social decision-
making mechanisms. They suggest that exogenous rather than the democratic assignment of
decision rights, as in oce rotation schemes, for example, might produce unwanted side-eects
due to less intrinsically motivated representatives. Non-pecuniary motivational eects provide
a novel explanation for recent empirical ndings showing that elected regulators or judges
behave dierently than appointed ones (see Besley and Case 2003).
Although our controlled experiment allows for straightforward causal interpretations, this
approach also entails limitations. For example, in order to properly identify the psychological
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cost of lying, we had to impose a higher degree of anonymity than typically present in real-
ity. How reputational concerns interact with psychological motivations is an interesting open
question. Some experimental evidence suggests that reputational concerns are complementary
and amplify pro-social behavior in social dilemmas (e.g. Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004). An-
other potential concern is that our student subject pool is not necessarily representative for
professional politicians. However, the existing evidence comparing students with non-standard
subject pools such as CEOs, public servants, or representative populations suggests that stu-
dent samples tend to provide a lower bound for the relevance of pro-social behavior (see Alatas
et al. 2009; Cappelen et al. 2011; Falk, Meier and Zehnder N.d.; Fehr and List 2004). Moreover,
Dawes, Loewen and Fowler (2011) provide evidence suggesting that the relationship between
social preferences and political participation is positive.
We believe that our experiment provides a simple and parsimonious framework that can
be further enriched, opening interesting avenues for future research. For example, one could
analyze self-selection by adding a stage where each participant is given the choice of running for
oce. Other extensions include allowing representatives to target their promises and benev-
olence to specic groups of voters such that minimum winning coalitions could potentially
emerge (see Groseclose and Snyder 1996). In general, the controlled lab environment opens up
many opportunities for learning more about the interplay between institutions (that dier for
example in their degree of democratic legitimacy) and policymaking.
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